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ISSN : 1229-0653

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Vol.31 No.1

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이익충돌 상황에서 공개가 사익추구행동에 미치는 영향: 자발 공개와 강제 공개의 비교

The effects of disclosing conflict of interest on consultation: A comparative study of voluntary and mandatory disclosure

한국심리학회지: 사회 및 성격 / Korean Journal of Social and Personality Psychology, (P)1229-0653;
2017, v.31 no.1, pp.23-39
https://doi.org/10.21193/kjspp.2017.31.1.002
김남호 (연세대학교)
정경미 (연세대학교)
김남호, & 정경미. (2017). 이익충돌 상황에서 공개가 사익추구행동에 미치는 영향: 자발 공개와 강제 공개의 비교. 한국심리학회지: 사회 및 성격, 31(1), 23-39, https://doi.org/10.21193/kjspp.2017.31.1.002

초록

이익충돌은 전문가로서의 책임이 개인적 이익과 상충되는 상태로, 부정부패 발생의 주요한 상황적 요인 가운데 하나이다. 실제 현장에서는 이익충돌에 따른 문제를 해결하기 위해 전문가가 이익충돌 사실을 사전에 공개하는 방법을 사용해왔으나, 이러한 공개의 효과에 대한 기존 연구들의 보고는 일관적이지 않다. 본 연구에서는 첫째, 이익충돌 상황에서 공개 조건과 공개 여부에 따른 사익추구행동의 차이가 있는지 검증하고, 둘째, 공개에 따른 집단 간 도덕적 정당화 수준의 차이가 있는지 검증하였다. 이를 위해, 대학생 109명(남: 65명, 여: 44명)을 자발 조건, 강제 공개 조건, 강제 비공개 조건으로 무선할당한 뒤, 이익충돌 상황에서 가상의 파트너에게 자문을 하는 온라인 컴퓨터 과제와 도덕적 정당화 수준과 도덕적 정체성을 측정하기 위한 사후 설문을 실시하였다. 연구 결과, 집단 간 도덕적 정체성의 차이는 나타나지 않았으며, 공개 조건과 공개 여부에 따른 상호작용 효과가 유의미하였다. 즉, 자발 조건에서는 공개 집단의 사익추구행동이 비공개 집단보다 유의미하게 작은 반면, 강제 조건에서는 공개 집단의 사익추구행동이 비공개 집단보다 유의미하게 큰 것으로 나타나 자발 조건에서는 공개의 기대효과가, 강제조건에서는 공개의 역효과가 나타남을 알 수 있었다. 또한, 강제 공개 집단이 강제 비공개 집단보다 사익추구행동을 더 정당화하는 것으로 나타나, 도덕적 정당화가 공개의 역효과를 설명하는 심리적 기제임을 알 수 있었다. 이 같은 결과를 바탕으로 본 연구의 함의와 의의에 더불어 한계점 및 후속 연구를 위한 제언을 논의하였다.

keywords
Conflicts of interest, Voluntary Disclosure, Mandatory Disclosure, Self-interested behavior, Moral licensing, 이익충돌, 자발 공개, 강제 공개, 사익추구행동, 도덕적 정당화

Abstract

Conflict of interest (COI) can lead people to give self-interested consultation in a field of business, medical/ pharmaceutical industry, research etc. Disclosure is often proposed as a remedy for various problems of COI but prior studies have reported inconsistent results regarding its effects on consultation. This study compared the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory disclosure of COI during consultation. A total of 109 participants were randomly assigned to one of 3 conditions: voluntary disclosure, mandatory disclosure, or non-disclosure. Participants were asked to provide consultation to a virtual partner in an on-line experiment; then, a questionnaire was administered to the participants to examine the effects of moral licensing. The results showed that participants who chose to disclose COI were less likely to provide self-interested consultation than participants who chose not to disclose COI. In contrast, participants who mandatorily disclosed COI were more likely to provide self-interested consultation compared to participants assigned to non-disclosure condition. Also, participants who mandatorily disclosed COI were more likely to consider their self-interested consultation as morally correct than non-disclosure condition. Implications and limitations are further discussed.

keywords
Conflicts of interest, Voluntary Disclosure, Mandatory Disclosure, Self-interested behavior, Moral licensing, 이익충돌, 자발 공개, 강제 공개, 사익추구행동, 도덕적 정당화

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